My colleagues are often surprised, when they ask me about my background, to hear that my bachelor's degree is not in, say, geography, or anything else that yields the most remote connection to my current line of work,—but in classics;—or, as I usually put it, ancient philosophy (so as not to give the impression that I know anything about, for example, ancient Roman history).
That said, many topics in ancient Greek philosophy turn out to be highly relevant in my professional life—not least of which is the One and the Many. For it often happens, as Plato understood well, that what appear to us as many things turn out to be one—and what we perceive as one thing falls apart, upon examination, into many.
For example, suppose you have a map of Ontario which has an inset map enlarging the densely populated southern tip of the province: Is this one map that has one inset, or is it many maps, i.e. two, a main map and an inset map?
Another example: some people have many opinions about baby names; I, however, only have one, and it is this: there should be more babies named Orlando. Observe: the name Orlando is borne by two of the greatest composers in the history of the world—Messrs. di Lasso and Gibbons. Why, then, should this name no longer be considered worthy of the children of this generation, whose culture is so indebted to those geniuses' efforts?
—But is this truly one opinion, or many? For it seems I believe (1) that Orlando is a noble and excellent name, (1a) for which the evidence is that it belongs to two so excellent and noble composers, yet (2) very few babies are now named Orlando, and (3) this situation is unjust. What would Plato say about that?